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1.1  Introduction 
International  capital  market  integration  has become  the subject of  major 
theoretical and practical interest in recent times. Policymakers are becoming 
more and more aware of the potential benefits accruing from such integration, 
which allows more efficient allocations of investment and saving between the 
domestic and the foreign market. In particular, with the prospective compre- 
hensive  integration of  capital  markets  in  Europe in  1992, some key policy 
issues arise.’ 
The financial,  monetary,  and  exchange-rate-management  policy  implica- 
tions of capital market integration have been widely discussed in the context 
of  the European  Monetary System (EMS); see, for instance,  the survey  by 
Micossi (1988). However, capital market integration also has profound effects 
on the fiscal branch of each country separately and on the scope of tax co- 
ordination  among them. These issues have  not been dealt with extensively 
so far.2 
One issue is the tax-induced distortions in the allocation of  world savings 
Assaf Razin is professor of economics at Tel Aviv University and a research associate of the 
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1.  In a recent paper Micossi (1988, 26) provides a succinct survey of the proposed institutional 
arrangements for the 1992 European integration. He writes: “The European integration entails the 
elimination of restrictions and discriminatory regulations and administrative practices concerning: 
(i) the right of establishment and acquisition of participations by foreign institutions in domestic 
financial markets; (ii) permitted operations of foreign-controlled financial institutions; (iii) cross- 
border transactions  in  financial services.  The first two items basically involve the freedom to 
supply services in EC national markets, the third,  the freedom to move capital throughout the 
Community.” 
2.  For  an  earlier discussion of  the interaction among taxes,  government consumption, and 
international capital flow, see Razin and Svensson (1938). 
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and  investment.  In a world  with  international capital mobility, the equality 
between savings and investment need not hold for each country separately, but 
rather for world aggregate savings and investment. This separation brings out 
new issues of taxation  in theory and practice.  In a closed economy a tax on 
capital income drives just one wedge between  the consumer-saver marginal 
intertemporal rate of substitution and the producer-investor marginal produc- 
tivity of  capital. In a world of open economies two more types of distortions 
can be caused by capital income taxation: (1) international differences in inter- 
temporal marginal rates of substitution, implying an inefficient allocation of 
world  savings across countries; (2) international differences in the marginal 
productivity  of capital, implying that world investment is not efficiently allo- 
cated across countries. 
The fundamental result  of  the theory of  second best suggests that adding 
distortions to already existing ones may very well enhance efficiency and wel- 
fare. To put it differently, reducing the number of distortions in the economy 
may lower well-being. Thus, even though there are in general gains from in- 
ternational  trade,  some restrictions  on  free  trade  may  be  called  for  in  a 
distortion-ridden economy. 
The opening up of an economy to international capital movements affects 
the  size and  structure of the fiscal branch  of its government.  Capital flows 
influence both the optimal structure of taxes on domestic and foreign-source 
income, and the welfare cost of taxation. As a result, the optimal size of gov- 
ernment (the optimal provision of public goods) and the magnitude of its re- 
distribution (transfer) policies are affected as well. 
Another issue is capital flight. There is now substantial evidence that gov- 
ernments  encounter  severe  enforcement  difficulties  in  attempting  to  tax 
foreign-source income. Dooley (1987) estimates that in 1980-82  as much as 
$250 billion may be classified as capital flight by U.S. residents. Tanzi (1987) 
reports that tax experts were concerned that lowering the U.S. individual and 
corporate tax rates in the U.S. Tax Reform Act of 1986 would induce capital 
drain from other countries by providing a tax advantage to investments in the 
U.S.  These concerns  are based  on an implicit  assumption that  the govern- 
ments of these countries cannot effectively tax their residents on their U.S. 
income so as to wipe out the U.S. tax advantage. The issue of capital flight is 
even more relevant for developing countries. Cumby and Levich (1987) esti- 
mate that a significant portion of  the external debt in developing countries is 
channeled into investments abroad through overinvoicing of imports and un- 
derinvoicing of exports. Dooley  (1988) estimates that capital  flight from  a 
large number of developing countries amounts to about one-third of their ex- 
ternal debt in 1977-84. 
Finally, integration of capital markets brings up the issues of international 
tax coordination,  harmonization,  and competition. There are two polar prin- 
ciples of international taxation: the residence (of the taxpayer) and the source 
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their worldwide income equally, regardless of whether the source of  income 
is domestic or f~reign.~  A resident in any country must earn the same net 
return on her savings, no matter to which country she chooses to channel her 
savings (the rate-of-return arbitrage). If  a country adopts the residence prin- 
ciple, taxing at the same rate capital income from all sources, then the gross 
return accruing to an individual in that country must be the same, regardless 
of  which country is the source of that return. Thus, the marginal product of 
capital in that country will be equal to the world return to capital. If all coun- 
tries adopt the residence principle, capital income taxation does not disturb 
the equality of the marginal product of capital across countries, which is gen- 
erated by  a free movement of  capital. If  the tax rate is not the same in all 
countries, however, the net returns accruing to savers in different countries 
vary, and the international allocation of world savings is distorted. 
According to the second principle, residents of a country are not taxed on 
their income from foreign sources, and foreigners are taxed equally as resi- 
dents on income from domestic sources. Now, suppose that all countries adopt 
this principle. Then a resident of country H earns in country F the same net 
return as the resident of  country F earns in country F.  Since a resident in 
country H must earn the same net return whether she channeled her savings to 
country H or to country F,  it follows that residents of  all countries earn the 
same  net  return.  Thus,  intertemporal  marginal  rates  of  substitution  are 
equated across countries, implying that the international allocation of  world 
savings is efficient. If the tax rate is not the same in all countries, however, the 
marginal product of  capital is also not the same in all countries. In this case 
the international allocation of the world stock of capital is not efficient. 
Although there are two extreme principles of  international taxation, in re- 
ality countries adopt a mixture of the two. Accordingly, countries partially tax 
foreign-source income of  residents and domestic-source income of  nonresi- 
dents,  in  which case the international allocations of  world savings and of 
world investments are distorted. 
These issues are of  particular relevance for the Europe of  1992. The crea- 
tion of a single capital market in the European Community raises the possibil- 
ity  of  tax  competition among the  member  countries,  in  the  absence of  a 
full-fledged harmonization of the income tax systems. Also, the possibility of 
capital flight from the EC to low-tax countries elsewhere has strong implica- 
tions for the national tax structures in the EC. These developments renewed 
interest among public finance and international finance economists in the issue 
of  tax  harmonization and  coordination,  tax  competition, the  international 
structure of taxation, etc4 
3.  A credit is given against taxes paid abroad on foreign-source income in order to avoid double 
taxation. 
4. See, for instance, Alworth (1988), Bovenberg (1988). Giovannini (1988, 1989a. 1989b), 
Gordon (1986), Razin and Sadka (1989, 1990, 1991), Razin and Slemrod (1990), Sinn (1987). 
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1.2  Restrictions on Capital Mobility 
1.2.1  The Analytical Framework 
Consider a stylized two-period  model of a small open economy with one 
composite good, serving for (private and public) consumption and for invest- 
ment.  In the first period the economy possesses  an initial endowment of the 
good, and individuals can decide how much of it to consume and how much 
of it to save. Savings are allocated either to investment at home or to invest- 
ment abroad. In the second period, output (produced by capital and labor) and 
income from foreign investment are allocated between private and public con- 
sumption. To  finance optimally its (public) consumption, the government em- 
ploys taxes on labor, taxes on income for investment at home, and taxes on 
income from investment abroad. For the sake of  simplicity, we assume that 
the government is active only in the second period. 
In practice,  governments encounter severe enforcement  difficulties in at- 
tempting to impose taxes on foreign-source income. For instance, many for- 
eign experts worried  that lowering the individual and corporate tax rates in 
the U.S.  Tax Reform Act of  1986 would induce a capital drain from other 
countries since it would increase the net return to capital in the United States. 
They implicitly  assume that  governments  cannot  effectively  tax  capital  in- 
vested abroad and thus cannot reduce the net return on that capital to the level 
of the domestic rate of return (see Tanzi 1987). Dooley (1988) estimates that 
a significant fraction of external claims and of external liabilities in various 
developing countries is unaccounted for due to capital flight.5 Therefore, after 
briefly analyzing the case where foreign-source  income is fully taxable, we 
concentrate on the more realistic case where such income is effectively taxed 
only partially. 
We consider a representative individual with a utility function of the form 
where up  and up  are the private and the public components of the utility func- 
tion, respectively; c,,  c2,  and L are first-period consumption, second-period 
consumption, and second-period labor supply, respectively; and G is second- 
period public consumption.6 
Denote savings in the form of domestic capital by K and savings in the form 
of foreign capital by B. Since the focus of our analysis is on the case where 
income from capital invested abroad cannot be fully taxed, we assume that the 
pattern of capital flows is such that the country is a capital exporter (i.e., B 2 
5. See also Dooley (1987), Cumby and Levich (1987), and Giovannini (1989b). 
6. To ensure diminishing marginal rates of substitution between private and public commodi- 
ties, we assume, as usual, that  up  and ug  are strictly concave. Notice also that the separability 
between private and public commodities embodied in equation (1) ensures that government spend- 
ing on public goods does not affect individual demand patterns for private goods or the supply of 
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0). Hence,  the amount of savings  channeled  through  domestic  investment 
constitutes also the domestic stock of capital in the second period. 
The private-sector  budget  constraints  in  the first  and  second  period  are 
given, respectively, by 
c, + K + B = 1. 
(3)  c,  = K[1  + (1 - t,)r] + B[1  + (1 -  t,)r*] + (1 -  t,)wL, 
where t, =' tax on capital income from domestic sources; 1,  = tax on capital 
income from foreign sources; t, = tax on labor income; r = domestic rate of 
interest; r*  = world rate of interest (net of taxes levied abroad); w  = wage 
rate; and 1  = initial endowment. 
Obviously in the absence of quantity restrictions on capital flows, the pri- 
vate sector must earn the same rate of return on domestic investment and on 
investment abroad, i.e., 
(4)  (1 -  t,)r  = (1 -  t,)r*. 
When quantity restrictions are imposed on investment abroad, the arbitrage 
condition (4) becomes 
(44 
(2) and (3) into a single (present value) budget constraint: 
(1 -  t,)r <  (1 -  t,)r*. 
As is common, we consolidate the periodic budget constraints in equations 
c, + qc, = I  + B((l + (1 -  t,)r*)q - l), 
where 
(6)  q = (1 + (1 -  tD)r)-] 
is the consumer (i.e., after-tax) price of second-period consumption in present 
values. In order to highlight the issues associated with capital-income taxation 
(i.e., saving and investment incentives and government tax revenues), we ab- 
stract from issues pertaining to variable-labor supply and assume that the labor 
supply is inelastic.  Accordingly,  after-tax labor income is added to the initial 
endowment, and their sum is denoted by I in equation (5).' 
The second term on the right-hand side of equation (5),  namely B((1 + (1 
- t,)r*)q - l), plays  a crucial role in the analysis.  In case there are no 
restrictions on capital exports, the arbitrage condition (4) must hold, and this 
term vanishes. Otherwise (when capital exports are restricted) condition (4a) 
applies, and this term becomes positive, representing inframarginal gains to 
the savings of the private sector that are channeled to investment abroad. 
7. It is straightforward  to show that efficiency  considerations usually require taxing the inelastic 
labor income first before moving on to taxing capital income. We  assume that the size of govern- 
ment  is large  enough so that  the  tax  on labor  income does not suffice to  finance government 
consumption and thus a distortionary tax on capital income is also required. Formally, we con- 
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A maximization of the utility function U, subject to the budget constraint in 
equation (3,  yields the consumption demand functions: 
(7)  c, = c,(q,  I + B((l  + (1 -  t,)r*)q - l)), 
The utility obtained from these demand functions (the indirect utility function) 
is 
(8) 
i = 1, 2. 
V = v(q, I + B((l  + (1 -  t,)r*)q - 1)) + u~(G). 
Domestic output (Y)  is produced in the second period by capital and labor, 
according to a production function that exhibits diminishing marginal prod- 
ucts. Suppressing the fixed labor input, we write the production function as 
(9)  Y = F(K). 
The firm’s demand for capital is determined by  the marginal productivity 
condition: 
(10)  F’(K) = R. 
Equilibrium in the first period requires that the demand for domestic capital 
(i.e., K)  is equal to the supply of domestic capital (i.e., I -  c, -  B): 
(11)  K  = I -  C, -  B. 
Similarly, equilibrium in the second period requires the equalization of  (pri- 
vate and public) demand for and supply of consumption goods? 
(12)  c2 + G = F(K) + K + (1 + r*)B. 
Substituting equation  (1  1) into equation (12) yields  the  single (consoli- 
dated) equilibrium ~ondition:~ 
(13)  c2 + G -  F(I -  C, -  B) - (I -  C, -  B) -  (1 + r*)B = 0. 
As mentioned previously, we employ the analytical framework to examine 
two distinct regimes. The first regime, which we may term the optimum, en- 
tails no constraints on the taxation of foreign-source income. This regime is 
considered a benchmark case. In the second, more realistic regime, which we 
may term the suboptimum, foreign-source income cannot be  taxed as effec- 
tively as domestic-source income. To  highlight the distinction between the 
regimes, we simply assume that in the second regime no tax can be levied on 
foreign-source income (i.e., t, = 0). 
8. This condition must hold because obviously there will be no savings and investment in the 
second (and last) period. 
9. The government budget constraint is rr$l  + r*r,B  + F(K) -  rK = G. Note that the term 
F(K) -  rK represents the revenue from taxes on labor income. Notice also that by Walras’s law 
this constraint is satisfied in equilibrium. 15  Tax  Systems and Capital Flows 
1.2.2  The Optimal Regime 
This section deals with  the case where the government can tax  foreign- 
source income as effectively as domestic-source income. The question natu- 
rally arises whether it would be indeed optimal to levy the same tax rate on 
the incomes from these two sources and abstain altogether from quantity con- 
trols on capital exports. 
Since there are distortionary taxes as part of the optimal program, the re- 
source allocation is obviously not  Pareto-eficient.  In general, the intertem- 
poral  allocation of  consumption,  the  leisure-consumption choice,  and  the 
private-public consumption tradeoffs are all distorted. Nevertheless, we show 
in this section that the optimal program (namely, the regime in which no con- 
straints on taxation of foreign-source income exist) requires an efficient allo- 
cation of  capital between investment at home and abroad, so that F, = t-*. 
That is, the marginal product of domestic capital must be equated to the for- 
eign rate of return on capital. 
To derive the optimal program, the government maximizes the indirect util- 
ity function in equation (8) subject to the equilibrium condition in equation 
(13). The control (policy) variables at the government's disposal are the tax 
rate on domestic capital income (t,)  or, more generally, the consumer price of 
future consumption (q),  the tax rate on capital income from abroad (fF),  the 
level of public consumption (G), and the quota on capital exports (B).  Carry- 
ing out the optimization problem yields the efficiency condition 
(14)  F'  = r* 
(see Razin and Sadka 1991). 
Accordingly, savings of  the private sector must be  allocated efficiently be- 
tween investment at home and investment abroad. Since F'  = r, the arbitrage 
condition is satisfied if the two tax rates are equalized, i.e., 
t, = t,. 
In such a case there is no need to impose any quantity restrictions on capital 
exports.Io 
1.2.3  The Suboptimal Regime 
We  turn now to a more realistic case where the government cannot effec- 
tively tax income from investment abroad. To  highlight this phenomenon we 
set t,  = 0 and write t, = t. In this case, if the government allows unlimited 
exports of capital, then capital will flow out of the country until the net return 
on domestic investment equals the net return on investment abroad: 
10.  Evidently this is an open economy variant of the aggregate efficiency theorem in optimal 
tax theory (e.g.,  Diamond and Mirrlees 1971, Sadka 1977, and Dixit 1985). 16  Assaf Razin and Efraim Sadka 
(16)  (1 -  t)r = r*. 
This means that F'  = r > r*, so that the domestic stock of capital is smaller 
than in the optimal regime (where F'  = r*),  given that the marginal produc- 
tivity of capital is diminishing. The mirror image of such an underinvestment 
in capital at home is an overinvestment in capital abroad. 
Therefore, an interesting issue that arises in this context is whether it is now 
efficient from the society standpoint to restrict the exports of capital,  and if 
so, how severe should the restriction be. One may ask, for instance, whether 
the restriction on exports of capital should bring the domestic capital stock all 
the way back to a level that is even higher than in the optimal regime (i.e., an 
overinvestment  in domestic capital). Furthermore, is it possible that capital 
exports should be altogether banned when foreign-source income cannot be 
effectively taxed? We address these issues below. 
To derive the effects of a change in the capital-export quota on welfare, we 
totally differentiate the indirect utility function in equation (8) with respect to 
B. This yields 
dv  K  _-  - -vy - -  + vy  ((1  + r*)q - l), 
dB  4 dB 
where vy  >  0 is the marginal utility of income. 
Similkly, total differentiation of the market-clearing condition in equation 
(13) yields the general  equilibrium effect of  a change in the capital export 
quota on the after-tax price of future consumption: 
4  (18) 
where 
-  = (-((1  + r)c,, + c2,)  ((1  + r*)q  - 1)  + r* -  r)A-', 
dB 
(19)  A  = (1 + r)c,, + czq  + ((1 + r)c,, + czy)(l  + r*)B < 0. 
The terms c,,  and cZy  are the income effects on present consumption and fu- 
ture consumption, respectively, and the terms c,,  and c,,  are the gross (future 
consumption) price effects on present consumption  and future consumption, 
respectively. Note that the specification in equation (18) implies that the gov- 
ernment adjusts its budget in response to the change in the capital export quota 
only by altering tax rates and not through adjustment in spending. However, 
the  derivations  below  show  that  welfare  improves  even  with the  restricted 
measures; a fortiori the welfare level  should rise with the unrestricted mea- 
sures. 
Consider now  the point  where  no restrictions  on capital  exports are im- 
posed. We refer to this case as the laissez-faire case. The arbitrage condition 
in equation (4) then implies that 17  Tax Systems and Capital Flows 
Hence, employing (17) and (18), we conclude that 
(21)  dvldB = -v,K(r*  -  r)A-I. 
Since r*  <  r and A < 0, it follows from equation (21) that dvldB < 0 at the 
laissez-faire point. This means that reducing B is welfare-improving . Namely, 
the government should impose a binding quota on capital exports in order to 
reduce the amount invested abroad. It can be shown that such a quota usually 
raises the stock of domestic capital. 
Having established that some restrictions on capital exports are desirable 
when the government is unable to tax the income from the exported capital, 
we  turn now to the question of  how  severe the restrictions should be. As a 
benchmark consider K* ,  the stock of domestic capital exported under the op- 
timal regime defined by F'(K*) = r*. Starting from this benchmark we now 
investigate the policy  question,  whether the restrictions on capital exports 
should be severe enough so as to bring the stock of domestic capital to a level 
that exceeds even K*, or whether the level of  domestic capital still remains 
below K*. (See fig. 1.1; K** is the second-best optimal capital stock, and K, 
is the laissez-faire capital stock.) 
Rate  of return 
I 
r(1-t I= r' 
r=r* 
r(l-t  l<r* 
r<  r' 
K'  KO'  Capital 
KLF 
Fig. 1.1  Efficient stock of domestic capital with and without taxation of 
foreign-source  income 
Note: Kw = laissez-faire stock of capital with no taxation of foreign-source income. K* = 
efficient stock of capital with taxation of  foreign-source income. K**  = efficient stock of 
capital with no taxation of  foreign-source income. 18  Assaf Razin and Efraim Sadka 
To do this, we evaluate the derivative of the indirect utility function, dvldB, 
at the point where K  = K* (and consequently, r = r*).  This derivative is 
(22) 
where c:~  is the Hicks-Slutsky compensated effect of a change in the price of 
future consumption (4)  on present consumption  (c,).  Since two goods must 
always be net substitutes, it follows that  c”;, > 0. Hence, dv/dB < 0 at the 
point K  = K*.  This means that reducing B further, beyond the point where K 
= K* (and r  = r*),  enhances individual welfare. This implies that the stock 
of domestic capital rises to a level that exceeds the corresponding level in the 
optimal regime, implying  that  r < r*. Thus, when the government cannot 
effectively tax  the income from the capital invested abroad, it is efficient to 
overinvest in capital at home up to a point where the marginal product (r)  falls 
below the world rate of interest (r*). 
Finally, we turn to investigate an extreme possibility: should capital exports 
be altogether banned  (i.e., B  = 0) when the government cannot effectively 
tax the income from the capital exported? Obviously, if dv/dB < 0 at B  = 0, 
then no capital exports should be allowed. 
It turns out that the latter is a real possibility. To  see this, notice that equa- 
tions (1 7)-( 19) imply after some tedious algebra that at B  = 0 we have 
= vyA-’(rtcYq((l + r*)q - 1) - c2(r* - r)). 
(23)  [3B=0 
Now, when r is sufficiently close to r*, then dv/dB <  0 because A < 0 and cyY 
> 0. In this case, a total ban on capital exports is called for. The rationale for 
this result is straightforward. When r is close to r*, there is very little gain for 
the society as a whole from investing abroad, because this gain is equal only 
to the difference between r and r*  (though the private  sector can  still gain 
considerably  from investing  abroad  if  r(1 - t) is considerably  below  r*). 
However, the government loses a significant amount of tax revenues from the 
outflow of capital. Therefore, in this case, it is not efficient to allow exports 
of capital. 
Since there  are distortionary  taxes  as part of  an optimal  fiscal program, 
obviously the resource allocation is not Pareto-efficient: the intertemporal al- 
location  of  consumption, the  leisure-consumption  choice, and  the  private- 
public consumption tradeoffs are all distorted. Nevertheless, when the govern- 
ment can tax its residents on their foreign-source capital income, it is optimal 
to allow capital to move freely in or out of the country. That is, optimal policy 
requires  an  efficient allocation  of  capital  between  investment at home  and 
abroad so that  the  marginal  product  of  domestic  capital is set equal to the 
world rate of interest (net of foreign taxes). Evidently, this is an open economy 19  Tax Systems and Capital Flows 
variant of the aggregate efficiency theorem in optimal tax theory (see Diamond 
and Mirrlees 1971, Sadka 1977, and Dixit 1985). 
Notice also that this production efficiency result implies also that it is opti- 
mal to have a nondifferential tax treatment of foreign and domestic sources of 
income. One might argue that the investment efficiency result (i.e., equating 
the return on capital at home to the return on capital abroad via free interna- 
tional capital flows) is not valid when the government is concerned about fi- 
nancing its debt. For opening an economy to international capital flows will 
raise the domestic interest rate to the world rate. In such a case, a government 
that is burdened by an ongoing deficit incurs a higher interest cost of financing 
this deficit.  In fact, it loses some of  its monopsony  power in the domestic 
capital market. It can then be argued that the government  may not wish  to 
allow residents to invest abroad. However,  in this case it can be shown that 
the investment efficiency result is still valid nevertheless, because the govern- 
ment can offset the cost of losing its monopsony power by an appropriate tax 
policy. 
We have shown, however, that when the government cannot effectively tax 
foreign-source income, it should put severe restrictions on capital exports and 
bring the marginal product of domestic capital to a level that is even below the 
world rate of interest. The loss in the return to the private sector on their total 
investments  (at  home and abroad)  due to the reallocation  of  capital  from 
abroad to home is more than offset by the extra tax revenues accruing to the 
government on the income from the capital shifted to home. 
An important issue concerning capital flight if capital mobility is effectively 
free is the vanishing of the capital income tax  from the optimal tax menu. 
Optimal taxation of capital income is usually subject to two conflicting forces. 
On the one hand, the income from existing capital is a pure rent and taxing 
away rents is efficient. On the other hand, the taxation of the returns on current 
and future investments would retard growth, which may not be efficient. We 
have argued that the optimal policy, in the face of free capital mobility, calls 
for applying  the residence  principle  of  a uniform  treatment of  foreign- and 
domestic-source  income. Consequently, if tax on foreign-source income from 
capital is not enforceable, the optimal tax on domestic-source income would 
vanish. 
In summary, no capital income tax whatsoever can be imposed efficiently 
by a small open economy if capital flight to the rest of the world cannot effec- 
tively be stopped. Consequently, all the burden of taxes falls on the interna- 
tionally immobile factors, such as labor, property, land, and so on. The global 
tax  system becomes very  much like a local  and state tax  system (within a 
federal system as in the United States), in which the largest share of revenue 
arises from taxes on property  and excises.  The capital-flight equilibrium  is 
obviously welfare inferior to the residence-based  system of  capital taxation 
that ensues whenever the tax enforcement problem is solved. 20 
1.3  The Cost of Public Funds and the Size of Government 
Assaf Razin and Efraim Sadka 
The optimal size of government, or more precisely the optimal provision of 
public  goods, must  be  determined  by  an  appropriate cost-benefit  analysis. 
Such analysis implies that the marginal cost of public funds must be equated 
to the marginal utility from public goods. To find the effect of liberalization in 
the international capital markets on the optimal quantity of public goods, we 
discuss here the effect of such a liberalization on the cost of public funds in a 
small open economy. 
In calculating the cost of public funds, one must take into account the opti- 
mal response of the structure of taxation (on incomes from all sources) to the 
international capital market liberalization, because the cost of public funds is 
derived from a process of tax optimization. Therefore, we must also discuss 
the effect of liberalization on the structure of  taxation. Of course, entangled 
with the structure of  taxation  is also the issue of the optimal size of  income 
redistribution. 
Suppose that the government can effectively tax  income  from capital in- 
vested abroad. In this case, a liberalization of  the capital market is welfare- 
improving. Therefore such a liberalization entails an income effect. Such an 
effect usually tends to increase the marginal utility of public goods. In addi- 
tion it may lower the marginal cost of  public funds because the government 
benefits  directly  from the liberalization as it taxes the increased  amount of 
income from the capital invested abroad and can therefore lower the tax bur- 
den on domestic sources. Therefore, the income effect tends to increase the 
provision of public goods and the size of income redistribution. On the other 
hand, the liberalization may change the internal terms of trade (e.g., the real 
wage, etc.) and affect directly the cost of producing public goods. The effect 
of  this change in the terms of trade on the cost of public funds and the size of 
government cannot a priori be determined  and should be examined empiri- 
cally. 
1.4  Feasible International Tax Structure 
Capital market integration between two countries brings out the issue of the 
feasibility of their tax structures. When residents of one country invest in the 
other country, one must reckon with the possibility of tax arbitrage that may 
undermine the feasibility of  integration. 
To  highlight this issue, consider a two-country world with perfect capital 
mobility. Denote the interest rates in the home country and the foreign country 
by rH  and f,  respectively. In principle, the home country may have three dif- 
ferent tax rates applying to interest income: 
the tax rate levied on domestic residents 
on their domestic-source income; 
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the tax rate levied on domestic residents 
on their foreign-source income;  tiF =  (ii) 
the tax rate levied on nonresidents on their 
t'RD  = interest income in the home country.  (iii) 
The foreign country may correspondingly have three tax rates, which we de- 
note by tiD,  tiF,  and tiRD.  Furthermore, assume that these rates apply symmet- 
rically for both interest earned and interest paid (i.e., full deductibility of in- 
terest expenses, including tax rebates). 
A complete  integration of  the capital markets between  the two countries 
(including the possibility of borrowing in one country in order to invest in the 





The first condition applies to the residents of the home country and requires 
that they  be indifferent between  investing  at home and  abroad.  Otherwise, 
they can borrow an infinite amount in the low (net of tax) interest-rate  country 
in order to invest an infinite amount in the high (net of tax) interest-rate coun- 
try.  The second  condition  similarly applies  to the  residents of  the  foreign 
country. 
r"(1 -  t")  = rF(1 -  tiRD)  (1 - tiF) 
rH(1 -  tCRD)  (1 - tiF)  = rF(1 - tiD). 
Notice that unless 
(26)  (1 -  tiJ  (1 -  tiD)  = (1 -  t'RJ(1  - ti,=) (1 -  tiRJ  (1 -  tfF), 
the only solution to the linear system of equations (24)-(25)  is a zero rate of 
interest in each country: 
rH=F=O. 
Thus, some feasibility conditions on the structures of  taxes must be met in 
order to satisfy (26) and yield a sensible world equilibrium. 
Somewhat  surprisingly,  the  two  polar  schemes  of  source-based  or 
residency-based  taxation are examples of  feasible tax structures even when 
the two countries do not adopt the same scheme. Consider first the case in 
which both countries adopt the source-based tax scheme. In this case, income 
is taxed according to its source, regardless of the residency of the taxpayer. 
This implies that 
(27) 
so that (26) is satisfied and we can have a world  equilibrium with positive 
rates of interest. 
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Similarly, consider the case where both countries adopt the residence prin- 
ciple: income is taxed according to the residency of the taxpayer, regardless 
of its source. This implies that 
(28)  tgD = tgF, tiD  = tgF, tERD = tLRD = 0, 
so that, again, (26) is satisfied. 
Next, consider the case in which one country adopts one tax scheme while 
the other adopts another one. Suppose, for instance,  that the home country 
adopts the residence  principle, while the foreign country  adopts the source 
principle. In this case we have 
(29) 
and, again, (26) is satisfied. 
However, if the two countries do not stick to one of the two polar schemes, 
then (26) need not hold and no sensible world equilibrium exists.  Suppose, 
for instance, that each country levies the same tax rate on its residents (irre- 
spective of the source of their income) and also all nonresidents investing in 
that country. In this case, we have 
t;D  = tgF, tERD = O,tiD = tiRD’  tiF = 0, 
tgD = tgF = tERD,  tiD  = tgF = tiRD. 
Hence, unless (1 -  tERD)  (1 -  t;RD) = 1, which is just a sheer coincidence, 
condition (26) is violated. 
Thus, some feasibility conditions on the tax structure are essential for a full 
capital market integration.  Any  mutually beneficial tax coordination or har- 
monization must satisfy the tax arbitrage condition (26). There are two con- 
siderations. One concerns the indirect manipulation of the international terms 
of trade by various fiscal measures (other than explicit trade barriers such as 
tariffs and quotas), which is akin to the familiar “trade wars.” Tax coordination 
is Pareto-improving  when the terms of trade are subject to manipulation by 
national governments. The second consideration, which received less atten- 
tion, concerns the international  and domestic misallocation of resources that 
is generated by tax competition for given terms of trade. 
This section focuses on the second of these two elements, since the first one 
has been exhaustively studied and has become by now a textbook case. Con- 
sider therefore a stylized model in which tax competition within the group of 
countries that we analyze cannot affect their terms of trade. This can be ac- 
complished by assuming that this group of countries is small relative to the 
rest of the world, which effectively sets the international terms of trade. 
Suppose first that fiscal policies are not harmonized internationally, so that 
the two countries are engaged in tax competition. Some minimal degree of 
coordination among the two countries and the rest of the world prevail, how- 
ever, so that they can effectively tax their residents on foreign-source income. 
It can be shown that it is not optimal from the individual country’s stand- 
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Each one of the competing countries would tax its residents uniformly on their 
capital income from all sources, domestic as well as foreign. Thus, tax com- 
petition leads each country to adopt the residence (or worldwide) principle for 
the taxation of income from capital. This behavior implies that there are no 
gains from tax harmonization. 
In order to implement effectively a policy of  taxing worldwide income, a 
considerable degree of coordination among countries is required, such as, for 
example, an exchange of information among the tax authorities, withholding 
arrangements,  relaxing bank secrecy laws, etc. Suppose that the competing 
countries can reach such coordination,  which enables each to effectively tax 
its residents on their income from capital invested in the other country, even 
though they continue to engage in tax competition. However, assume now that 
they cannot tax the income from capital invested in the rest ofthe world, as 
they have no coordination  (exchange of  information,  etc.) agreements with 
the rest of the world.  This seems a rather interesting and realistic  case that 
captures the essence of  a problem hindering European integration, that of cap- 
ital moving to low-tax countries in the rest of the world. 
It can be shown in this case that the rate-of-return  arbitrage condition pre- 
vents each one of the competing countries from taxing its residences on their 
income from capital invested in the other country, even though their tax au- 
thorities can cooperate on such things as tax withholding, etc. This may ex- 
plain why the EC dropped the idea of imposing a withholding tax on capital 
income. Tax competition leads to an extreme situation where no tax whatso- 
ever is imposed by any one of the competing countries on capital income from 
any source. All of the tax burden falls on the internationally immobile factors 
(unskilled labor, land, etc.).  Here again it can be shown that tax harmoniza- 
tion among our initially competing countries will yield no gains for them. 
In conclusion, there are no gains from tax harmonization among competing 
countries that constitute just a fraction of the world economy, regardless of 
whether or not they are coordinated with the rest of the world. However, the 
first case in which there is some coordination with the rest of the world yields 
a higher level of  welfare compared to the second case where no such coordi- 
nation exists. These propositions underscore the important role of tax coordi- 
nation. 
Bilateral double-taxation  agreements  are often  in  the  form of credit and 
exemption provisions implemented by the residence country. These methods 
are close sometimes to the residence principle, but at other times to the source 
principle.  Under the credit system firms typically pay the residence country 
tax when this country tax is higher than the tax in the source country. How- 
ever, companies  often defer the taxation  of  foreign subsidiary income until 
repatriation and can thus effectively  choose to pay  according to the  source 
principle if the source country tax is lighter. If the source country tax is higher 
than the residence country tax, the tax system under the credit system effec- 
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Tax exemption by the country of residence, at the company level, is often 
consistent with the source principle.  Things become even more complex for 
multinational corporations  with highly integrated activities across countries, 
by the conduct of various transfer price techniques to allocate profits so as to 
minimize the tax burden. In such cases the tax system is effectively consistent 
with the residence or the source principles,  depending  on whether the resi- 
dence or the source country is the one that imposes the lower tax rate. 
Table  1.1, which summarizes the corporate  tax systems in the European 
Community, shows a large disparity in tax rates and the frequency of  credit- 
exemptions provisions.  Our analysis suggests that substantial convergence of 
rates and credit-exemptions provisions consistent with the residence principle 
is expected  with the creation of the single capital market in Europe and the 
further integration of the world capital market in the 1990s. 
1.5  Conclusion 
We  analyze three policy issues that arise with the international integration 
of  the capital markets.  One issue is the effects of the opening up of  an econ- 
omy to international  capital movements  on the size of  government and the 
structure of taxes. A second issue is the incentive to restrict the size of capital 
exports in the presence of capital flight. A third issue is the provisions of  the 
Table 1.1  European Community: Corporate Tax Systems (1989) 
Statutory, 
Corporate  Investment  Taxation of Foreign 
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Exemption 
Deduction or Exemptionb 
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Credit or Exemptionb 
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Deduction Credit or Exemptiond 
Credit or Deduction' 
Source: A. Lans Bovenberg and George Kopits, Harmonization of Taxes on Capital Income and 
Commodities in the European Community, International Monetary Fund, October 1989. 
'Exemption is from France, Germany, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain. 
bExemption under treaty. 
'Credit. 
Tredit on exemption under treaty. 
cDeduction under treaty. 25  Tax Systems and Capital Flows 
taxation of foreign-source income from capital that emerge from international 
tax competition and the advantages of  international tax harmonizations. Our 
analysis suggests that a significant tax restructuring could follow the progress- 
ing process of integration of  the world capital markets, and we highlight the 
significance  of  coordination  between  national  tax  authorities to enable the 
functioning of a worldwide system of taxing capital income. 
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Comment  Toshihiro Ihori 
Assaf Razin and Efraim Sadka present a very clean theoretical paper that ex- 
plains its assumptions and conclusions and leaves little for the discussant to 
do except to provide an intuitive explanation of the results.  The paper pro- 
vides a very neat analysis of  the profound effects of capital market integration 
on the fiscal policy of each country separately and on the scope of  tax coordi- 
nation among them. This paper discusses two issues: tax-induced distortions 
in the allocation of world savings and investment, and the issue of tax coordi- 
nation. I would like to comment on the first issue. 
The main conclusion  of  section  1.2 is that  when the government cannot 
effectively tax foreign-source income, it should put severe restrictions on cap- 
ital exports. First, let me explain intuitively the results using a diagram. Sup- 
pose G = 0, and hence the government need not impose any taxes. In such a 
case there is no need to impose any quantity restrictions on capital exports, B. 
As shown in figure lC.l,  the laissez-faire is optimal. E* is the optimal pro- 
duction point and F*  is the optimal consumption point. Figure IC. 1 may be 
regarded as the standard diagram with respect to gains from trade. c,  may be 
regarded as an export good, c, as an import good, and B  as the amount of 
exports. 
Suppose now G > 0, and G is returned in a lump-sum manner. Note that if 
lump-sum taxes are available, F*  is still optimal. If lump-sum taxes are not 
available and the government can tax foreign-source income as effectively as 
domestic-source income, F,  is the optimal point. This case corresponds to the 
optimal regime of  section  1.2.2. On the analogy of  trade theory, t, may be 
regarded as a consumption tax on the import good, c2. 
Suppose the government cannot effectively  tax  income  from  investment 
abroad, t, = 0. In figure 1C.2 E,  is the production point in the laissez-faire 
case (r* <  r),  and F,  is the associated consumption point. On the analogy of 
trade theory the exporting industry, which is producing c ,, now receives sub- 
sidies because t, = 0 is less than t,.  In figure 1C.2  E*  is the production point 
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in the benchmark case (Y  = Y*),  and F,  is the associated consumption point. 
Utility at F,  is less than utility at F,  because q is larger in the benchmark case 
than in the optimal regime case. E, = F,  is the equilibrium point under finan- 
cial autarky (B = 0). Section 1.2.3  shows that utility at F,  may well be higher 
than utility at F,  or F,. 
Let me explain intuitively why a total ban on capital exports is called for. 
An increase in B means a decrease in K, and hence the revenue from taxes on 
labor income (F(K) - YK)  will be reduced.  In order to meet the government 
budget constraint, t, has to be raised. This will raise q and hence reduce the 
welfare.  Equation (17) implies that dq/dB > 0 is necessary for dv/dB < 0 if 
(1 + r*)q - 1 > 0. The sign of dqidB is crucial for the present analysis. 
I have a question about the sign of dqldB at B = 0. Suppose t, > 0 and tw 
= 0; that  is, although  the  government  cannot effectively  tax  income from 
investment abroad (t, > t!.), the government can still impose a positive tax 
rate on B. And labor income taxes are not available. Then the government 
budget  constraint  is t,rK  + t,r*B  = G.  Suppose also for simplicity rK  is 
independent of K. In such a case an increase in B and the associated decrease 
in K would mean an increase in tax revenues if t, is fixed. A decrease in t, is 
thus required to satisfy the government budget constraint, which means dq/dB 
< 0 at B = 0. If this case happens, from equation (17) dvldB > 0 at B  = 0. 
In the present paper, since labor supply is assumed to be fixed, tw  is raised to 
unity. However,  if labor supply is highly elastic, tw  may be quite low. Would 
the main conclusion of section 1.2.3 still hold in such a case? 
Comment  John Whalley 
This is an extremely interesting and well-written piece by Assaf  Razin and 
Efraim Sadka, as we have come to expect from this very distinguished pair of 
authors. It looks at issues concerning international capital flow and how they 
affect tax interactions between economies. It argues, in effect, that tax com- 
petition between economies will tend to lead them to adopt a residence prin- 
ciple for taxation, and in such circumstances there are no gains from tax har- 
monization.  On the other hand, if various restrictions are introduced, such as 
the inability of countries to tax capital abroad, and are combined with arbi- 
trage conditions, tax competition  will also imply that there are no taxes on 
mobile factors, only on immobile factors. 
As far as I know, this last proposition is certainly new, relative to previous 
literature on tax competition, and as this literature generally is quite limited, 
this work is especially important. My comments are threefold. First, it seems 
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to me that in the paper there are some areas of institutional weaknesses that 
could be improved upon. Second, the discussion of tax instruments is worthy 
of comment. Finally, I will make some comments on the posture of the paper 
in the wider context of EC integration. 
In terms of the institutional weaknesses, these may be relatively minor, but 
the  discussion  in  section  1.4 of  bilateral  double-taxation  agreements often 
being  in the form of  credits and exemption  provisions  implemented by  the 
resident’s country,  seems to me to negate what double-taxation treaties are 
typically all about. While they may mutually  specify some treatment within 
the country, double-taxation agreements usually focus on the withholding tax 
rates on dividends, interest, and royalties. The discussion of double-taxation 
treaties that follows is misfocused. 
Second, there  is discussion  of  the  creation  of  a single capital market  in 
Europe in  1992. In fact, the 1992 exercise, while it has discussed capital in- 
tegration,  has done so in a very  limited  way.  The major focus has been on 
treatment of banking under the single banking license. Discussion of harmo- 
nization  of  corporate taxes has been  separate from the  1992 exercise. This 
policy discussion, it seems to me, is also misplaced. 
Furthermore, throughout the paper there are incorrect references to various 
features of arrangements. For instance, table 1.1 implies there is a single cor- 
porate tax rate in Germany, but because of the split credit imputation system, 
a 56-36 split in rates currently applies. 
Beyond this, the discussion of instruments is worthy of further comment. 
Section  1.4 begins with a consideration of  three tax rates t,,,  t,,,  and t,,,. 
The first two of these, it seems to me, are typically treaty-bound and therefore 
usually the same, which places substantial limitations on the analysis that fol- 
lows. In addition, it is misplaced to argue that these are the only instruments 
that countries use to control capital flows. Part of the Uruguay Round exer- 
cise, for instance, is about trade-related investment measures (TRIMS). These 
may  include  participation  schemes  commonly  used  in  particular  sectors, 
which guarantee participation of  domestic equity owners. There are also tax 
holidays and many other such instruments.  Thus, a full range of  instrument 
substitution has to be acknowledged, even though it may be difficult to build 
into the analytical structure of the paper. 
Finally, I have a few comments on European integration and how this fits 
into the wider discussion in the paper. Since the relative absence of tax com- 
petition in the European case is a particularly notable feature, it is interesting 
that  thirty  years  after the  Treaty of  Rome  there  is still no agreement on a 
common corporate tax system.  There have been repeated  attempts to move 
toward  a common  imputation system, but  at the moment no draft directive 
exists on what that common system will be. With the likely eventual move to 
an imputation system,  however, there is also talk of  the use of  a refundable 
credit system with refundability limited to other EC countries, the echo of the 
restricted origin principle long discussed for the VAT. 
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rate  reductions  that have  occurred  in  recent  years  across  all the  European 
countries seem to me, again, not to have been driven by tax competition ef- 
fects but by a common intellectual climate under which it was widely believed 
that reductions in taxes to stimulate investment  would be good. This began 
with the  1984 budget in the United Kingdom and continued with tax reduc- 
tions in a number of other European countries. Thus, one might be tempted to 
conclude that, in the mid- to late 1980s, reductions in corporate tax rates were 
widespread  among the European countries and were a reflection of tax com- 
petition.  I would strongly disagree with that proposition. The European ex- 
perience,  it seems to me, even though it may have some relationship to the 
analysis in this paper, is more distant than the authors suggest. 